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Abstract
We study a model in which two parties compete by announcing their policies,
after receiving conditionally independent private signals about the true state of
the world. Parties are both office- and policy-motivated. Our model can explain
radically different policy positions, even when parties receive identical signals and
have unbiased preferences. This holds in an asymmetric equilibrium in which both
parties reveal their private information to the voters and the implemented policy is
(almost) first-best for all possible realizations of parties’ signals. In this equilibrium,
one party adopts extreme and the other one moderate policy positions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate how electoral competition aggregates the private informa-
tion held by political parties and conveys it to voters. Consider two parties competing
in an election. Each of the two parties receives a private (binary) signal from an expert,
assessing the benefit of a public investment. A party commits to a (continuous) policy
platform after observing its private signal, and the winner implements its announced pol-
icy after the election. While parties have access to experts’ opinions, that can sometimes
be conflicting, an individual voter does not have the necessary resources or incentives to
become informed about this specific policy issue. However, voters may infer the experts’
signals that parties have received, by observing their policy platforms.
We show that situations can arise endogenously in which two parties systematically
respond differently to identical signals: while one party always responds moderately to
the (private) signal it receives, the other party over-reacts to its private signal and adopts
extreme policy positions. The co-existence of such a “moderate” and an “extreme” party,
can be socially desirable and lead to (almost) first-best results, for any realization of the
two parties’ signals. We then discuss how our equilibrium predictions relate to real-world
examples: the involvement of Western European countries in the 2003 Iraq war, climate
policy, and nuclear electricity in Germany.
We assume that parties are both office- and policy-motivated (Callander, 2008). Their
evaluation of an efficient policy is not systematically biased: if parties have access to
identical information, they agree on what the socially optimal policy should look like.
Hence, we abstract from systematic biases in parties’ preferences, reflecting among other
things differences in their constituencies, in their exposure to lobbyist groups, or in their
ideology. While such factors may also play an important role in many real-world politics,
our model can help to explain policy divergence – even under identical signals – and the
emergence of moderate and radical parties in their absence.
We find that, if at least one party has sufficiently high policy motivation, an asym-
metric equilibrium exists that successfully aggregates all available information, and where
policies close to the first-best are implemented for any realization of the two parties’ sig-
nals. In this equilibrium, one “moderate” party adopts a “pandering” strategy, offering a
platform that is close to the optimal policy given the prior of the voters, but still transmits
its signal. This party is elected under conflicting signals, and therefore implements an al-
most optimal policy when elected. The other party is more responsive to the information
it receives and offers an “anti-pandering” platform in which it truthfully transmits its sig-
nal, but that is only optimal if two (conditionally) independent and identical signals are
transmitted. This party is elected when both signals are identical, and therefore imple-
ments the optimal policy when elected. If only one party is sufficiently policy motivated,
this party is the moderate one. This implies that the party that cares the least about
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the policy outcome makes the most audacious proposals, while the party that cares the
most about it offers almost identical platforms regardless of the information it receives.
There also exists a symmetric revealing “anti-pandering” equilibrium in which the
implemented policies are too extreme, given the limited amount of information received
by each party. It is the unique symmetric revealing equilibrium of our game. In a related
model, Kartik, Squintani, and Tinn (2015) show that such an anti-pandering equilibrium
is the unique symmetric revealing pure-strategy equilibrium of a game with continuous
state, signal, and policy spaces when both parties have pure office motivation. If office
motivation is sufficiently high for both parties, a symmetric “pandering” equilibrium
exists in our model where both parties announce a moderate platform and no information
is revealed. Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) show that pandering is the unique equilibrium
in a setting with binary signal and policy spaces, and pure office motivation.
A first key assumption of our model is that information is coarser than actions: a
binary signal and a continuous action space. In theory, we can expect such a structure
to arise when a party receives information from an expert, but their interests are not
perfectly aligned. This is the classic result of Crawford and Sobel (1982): information
transmission from a sender to a receiver takes the form of reporting in which element of
a partition of the support of a continuous signal the sender’s observation lies in. It is
however a limitation of our model, made for tractability.
A second assumption is that the issue is more pragmatic than ideological. There may
be political disagreement ex-ante on a how much to invest on a project. If the issue
is pragmatic however, the success of a given investment is not controversial after the
uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, if the issue is mostly ideological, parties and voters
may continue to disagree after the fact, because they have different preferences. For
instance, the cost-efficiency of a large infrastructure project seems a rather pragmatic
issue. The impact of a tax-cut may be more ideological.
A third assumption is that a party is committed to implement its announced platform
if elected. This assumption is standard in Downsian models in general, and in models of
information transmission through the choice of political platforms in particular (Heidhues
and Lagerlöf, 2003, Loertscher, 2012, Kartik et al., 2015). Commitment is an important
characteristic of real-world electoral competition: voters typically see “flip-flopping” on
issues – saying something one day and changing opinion later – as a negative characteristic
of politicians and a sign of lower competence (see for instance Hummel, 2010). In our
asymmetric equilibrium however, when parties implement the socially optimal outcome,
they have no incentive to change their policy after the election. If parties were able
to renege on their commitment after observing conflicting signals, the anti-pandering
equilibrium would not be sustainable.
The next section reviews the related literature. We present the model in Section
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3. Section 4 provides the main results, starting with the almost efficient asymmetric
equilibrium, then the revealing symmetric one and the non-revealing pandering one. We
also discuss the multiplicity of equilibria and when we can expect one to be more “focal”
than the others. Section 5 discusses real-world examples. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Literature:
In a closely related paper, Ambrus, Baranovskyi, and Kolb (2017) consider a situation
in which an uninformed principal (corresponding to the voters in our model) chooses
between one out of two experts (the candidates in our model) to do a job. As in our
setup, each of the experts also receives a private signal about the state of the world. The
main difference is that these authors assume that the experts are biased, while we assume
that candidates have unbiased preferences, matching those of the (median) voter. Their
model allows for purely policy-motivated experts, or experts that have mixed motives (as
in our model).
Focusing on pure office motivation, Kartik et al. (2015) show that the welfare of the
voters under political competition cannot be higher (in expectation) than in a situation in
which only one party’s information is available. In contrast, we show that in the presence
of at least one party with sufficient policy motivation, electoral competition can deliver
(almost) first-best results (given both signals). Another explanation for symmetric policy
divergence in a Downsian model is provided by Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2009).
These authors show that if parties only imperfectly know the preferences of the median
voter, they may offer diverging platforms partly following their own bias. Laslier and
Van der Straten (2004) analyze a model related to Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003), but
assume that also voters (as well as each of the parties) receive a private signal. The
authors show that in equilibrium, parties truthfully reveal their signals, if voters possess
sufficiently precise information. Our model also relates to Loertscher (2012). We share
with this paper the assumption of binary signals and continuous policy space, together
with similar concepts of equilibrium refinement. The author finds equilibria in mixed
strategies in which some information is transmitted. However, he focuses on pure office
motivation, so that the asymmetric equilibrium we identify is not a feature of his model.
A model in which parties are primarily policy-motivated is introduced by Schultz
(1996). In contrast to our approach, Schultz (1996) does not assume that parties are
uncertain about the true state of the world (only voters are). Martinelli (2001) analyzes
a model in which parties with polarized preferences care about the implemented policy.
Voters and parties receive noisy signals about the true state of the world. In contrast
to our model (as well as Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) and other authors), the author
assumes that both parties receive the same signal.
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The conjunction of policy and office motives for parties has been introduced by
Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) who show that policies do not generally converge
in a two-party electoral equilibrium. Building on this framework, Cukierman and Tom-
masi (1998) show that biased parties can offer policies at the extreme opposite of their
own preferences.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) assume that voters are uncertain about the true
state of the world and each voter obtains a private signal. However, the alternatives
from which voters can choose are exogenously fixed and not determined via electoral
competition. Gratton (2014) demonstrates in a similar framework that when policies are
determined endogenously via electoral competition, voters can coordinate their votes and
induce candidates to adopt the optimal policy in each state.
3 Model
As a running example, consider the political economy of an investment to prevent a
potential catastrophe, such as climate change, a military threat or an epidemic. Suppose
there are two states of the world: G (‘good’) and B (‘bad’). The true state of the world
is denoted by W ∈ {G,B}. In the good state there is no approaching catastrophe, so
investment to prevent the catastrophe is not warranted. In the bad state, there is an
approaching catastrophe; but the probability that it occurs can be reduced by investing
(x). If the catastrophe occurs, a damage of D > 0 is incurred by society. Otherwise, the
damages are assumed to be zero. The model also applies to an uncertain investment in
a project delivering a positive outcome, such as an infrastructure project or a scientific
innovation. The state of the world G then corresponds to a case where the investment will
never be successful, while state B means that the investment is successful with probability
x.
We assume that society can implement any investment x in the interval X = [0, 1].
Given that W = B, the probability that the catastrophe occurs is then 1 − x, while it
is zero when W = G (irrespective of the chosen effort x). The effort x is determined by
the government. What we are interested in is how effective a representative democracy is
in providing an optimal level of effort, given the uncertainties surrounding the problem.
We assume that there are two parties, indexed i ∈ {1, 2}, that announce policy platforms
xi ∈ X. Then, an election takes place, and the winning party implements its announced
platform.
3.1 Information structure and payoffs
Before parties announce their policy platforms xi (i ∈ {1, 2}), each of them receives a
private signal si about the true state of the world, W . We assume that these signals are
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binary: si ∈ {g, b}, where a “good” signal (si = g) indicates a lower probability that a
catastrophe is approaching than a “bad” signal (si = b). The two parties’ signals s1 and
s2 are drawn independently from the same distribution. More specifically, we assume
that each party receives a correct signal, conditional on the true state, with probability
p ∈ (1/2, 1), hence, Pr[si = g|W = G] = Pr[si = b|W = B] = p. We focus on pure
strategies.1 Hence, party i’s strategy xi(si) (i ∈ {1, 2}) is a mapping from si into X.
By contrast, voters do not observe any signal. We assume that nature selects W = G
with commonly known prior probability of 1/2.2 However, after observing the policy
platforms which are simultaneously announced by the two parties, voters update their
belief according to Bayes’ rule. We denote the voters’ belief that W = G after observing
the platforms by µ(x1, x2). We assume that all voters have identical preferences.
3
The cost of an investment x is given by x2/2. Conditional on the true state of the





if W = G,
−x2
2
− (1− x)D if W = B.
(2)
Voters’ preferences are thus characterized by the following (expected) utility function:
u(µ, x) = µv(G, x) + (1− µ)v(B, x)
= −x2/2− (1− µ)(1− x)D. (3)
Given our restriction to pure strategies, party i’s strategy is either fully revealing,
which means that it chooses a policy platform xi(g) after observing a good signal that
differs from its platform choice xi(b) after observing a bad signal, or it is non-revealing,
so that xi(g) = xi(b).
Let β(s1, s2) (for belief) be the function that aggregates parties’ signals when one or
two signals are observed, or inferred by voters from observing policy platforms. Given
our earlier assumptions about signals, we obtain the following conditional probabilities
1Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) and Loertscher (2012) analyze also mixed strategies.
2The case where nature selects the state W = G with a probability different from 1/2 is considered
in the online appendix. This serves us as a robustness check.
3Hence, voters can be replaced by a ‘representative voter’. Alternatively, one could assume that both
parties have preferences over policies which are identical to that of the median voter.
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2 + xD if W = B.
(1)
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that the true state of the world is G:
βgg ≡ β(g, g) = Pr[W = G|s1 = s2 = g] =
p2
p2 + (1− p)2
, (4)
βbb ≡ β(b, b) = Pr[W = G|s1 = s2 = b] =
(1− p)2
p2 + (1− p)2
, (5)
βgb ≡ β(g, b) = β(b, g) = Pr[W = G|si = g, s−i = b] = 1/2, (6)
where βgg, βbb, and βgb are introduced as short-hand notation. Note that (by (6)) two
conflicting signals “cancel each other out”, so that βgb = 1/2 corresponds to voters’ prior
belief that the true state of the world is G, when no signal is available. Furthermore, if
only one signal g (resp. b) is observed or inferred, we denote by n an unobserved signal.
We find for the conditional probability that the true state of the world is G:
βg ≡ β(g, n) = β(n, g) = Pr[W = G|si = g] = p, (7)
βb ≡ β(b, n) = β(n, b) = Pr[W = G|si = b] = 1− p, (8)
where the latter implies that Pr[W = B|si = b] = p.
As a short-hand notation, let ŝi(xi) ∈ {g, b, n} denote party i’s signal as inferred by the
voters after observing policy platform xi in three special cases. Inferred signals ŝi(xi) ∈
{g, b} corresponds to voters inferring player i has observed signal ŝi with probability
1 when playing action xi. The third element of the set, ŝi(xi) = n, corresponds to
voters ignoring the signal observed by player i. This can either correspond to the player
adopting a non-revealing strategy, or to voters not inferring anything about the signal
that a deviator has observed. Voters’ belief that the true state of the world is G in a fully
revealing equilibrium (x1, x2), is, then given by:
µ(x1, x2) = β(ŝ1(x1), ŝ2(x2)) = β(s1, s2). (9)
Since signals are imperfect, the true state is never fully revealed. In any equilibrium and
for any realization of parties’ signals, it holds that µ(x1, x2) ∈ [βbb, βgg].
Let us finally specify parties’ preferences. We assume that these are aligned with
those of the voters (parties care about the efficiency of the implemented policy), but they
also have an office-holding motive. The latter amounts to a fixed utility premium fi ≥ 0
for a party i ∈ {1, 2} that wins the election. For instance, consider some hypothetical
situation where party i is elected with probability one when offering platform xi. Its
expected utility is then given by
u(β(si, n), xi) + fi,
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where xi is the implemented policy, and β(si, n) is the party’s belief that W = G after
observing its private signal, but not the signal of the other party. A complete description
of parties’ expected utility is provided in Section 3.4.
As signals convey information about the true state of the world, one’s signal also
conditions the expectation of the signal observed by the other party. For instance, party
1’s expectation about the likely realization of party 2’s signal, after observing its own
private signal s1, is captured by the following conditional probability:
π ≡ Pr[s2 = g|s1 = g] = Pr[s2 = b|s1 = b] = p2 + (1− p)2, (10)
where π is again a short-hand notation.
3.2 Voting behavior
Conditional on their belief µ = µ(x1, x2) that the true state of the world is G, voters’
most preferred policy (in X) is:
x̃ = (1− µ)D. (11)
This follows simply from maximizing (3) over x. We restrict the size of the damages D
so that x̃ ≤ 1 is always satisfied. This requires that x̃ ≤ 1 holds for the most pessimistic
beliefs that can occur, i.e., µ = βbb, which leads to the parameter restriction D ≤ π/p2.
If parties announce different platforms, voters prefer policy x1 over x2 (given µ) if
u(µ, x1) > u(µ, x2),
which is equivalent to (using (3) and (11))
|x̃− x1| < |x2 − x̃|.
Hence, party 1 is elected with probability 1 if and only if its announced policy is closer to
their most preferred policy, x̃. This property allows us to directly compare our results to
the ones in Ambrus et al. (2017) and Kartik et al. (2015), in which voters have a quadratic
loss function of being away from their most preferred policy. We further assume that ties
are broken randomly at equilibrium so that each party is elected with probability 1/2 when
no off-path5 policy platform is chosen by any party and voters are indifferent between
the platforms x1 and x2 (given their belief µ(x1, x2)). We discuss in Section 4.1 how
tie-breaking-rules affect the existence of equilibria in the case where voters are indifferent
5Throughout this paper, we refer to “off-path” actions as actions that should never be chosen by
a player if this player sticks with her equilibrium strategy (for any realization of her signal), whereas
“out-of-equilibrium” actions are deviations in general, including a deviation to a policy that should be
played after receiving the opposite signal.
8
between an on-path policy platform of one party and an off-path platform of the other
party.
We express the voting behavior by a function σ(x1, x2), which is the probability of
electing party 1 when parties announce platforms (x1, x2). Given our above assumptions,
in any pure-strategy equilibrium, σ can only take on the values 0, 1/2, and 1.
3.3 Social optimum
In order to understand parties’ platform choices, we first need to characterize the so-
cial optimum, defined as the utility of the representative voter, given the informational
constraints. This social optimum would be obtained if both parties’ signals were made
public, and voters could directly choose their most preferred policy in X = [0, 1], given
their updated belief about the probability that W = G. When s1 = s2 = g, then µ = βgg
(see (4)), so that (by (11)) the optimal policy is
x∗gg ≡ (1− βgg)D =
(1− p)2D
p2 + (1− p)2
. (12)
Similarly, when s1 = s2 = b then the most preferred policy is x
∗
bb ≡ (1 − βbb)D. When
signals differ, the optimal policy is x∗gb ≡ (1− βgb)D = D/2. We refer to D/2 also as the
“neutral policy”: the optimal policy when no signal is revealed.
Let us also characterize the optimal policy when only one signal is revealed. Then we
obtain
x∗g ≡ (1− βg)D = (1− p)D (13)
if the signal is g, and x∗b ≡ (1− βb)D = pD if the signal is b.
We illustrate the optimal platform choices in Figure 1 (for the parameter values D = 1
and p = 0.7). Observe that x∗g and x
∗




bb, are located symmetrically around
the neutral policy D/2 = x∗gb.
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
∗   ∗ ∗   ∗ ∗
Figure 1: Optimal policies, for p = 0.7 and D = 1
Later, we analyze “symmetric revealing equilibria”. These are equilibria in which
each party chooses a policy platform xg if it observes a good signal, and platform xb if
it observes b. The qualifier “symmetric” refers to the restriction that these two values
are the same for both parties; and “revealing” means that the two platforms xg and xb
differ, so that voters can infer the signal of each party that is playing this strategy. As
a benchmark for such equilibria, let us here analyze how such policies xg and xb that
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satisfy these constraints would be chosen optimally in order to maximize the expected
utility of the voters, and compare it to the social optimum. Because policies that are
located symmetrically around the neutral policy will turn out to play a central role later
on, we also study a case with the additional restriction: xb = D − xg.
Lemma 1. Assume both signals are revealed:
1. The policies xg = x
∗
gg (when s1 = s2 = g), xb = x
∗
bb (when s1 = s2 = b) and
xgb = x
∗
gb (when s1 6= s2) deliver the highest expected utility to the voters.
2. If only two different policies can be implemented (xg and xb), then the policies
xg = x
∗
gg (when s1 = s2 = g) and xb = x̃b
6 ∈ (x∗gb, x∗b) (in all other cases) deliver
the highest expected utility to the voters. Those policies are welfare equivalent to
the mirror xb = x
∗
bb (when s1 = s2 = b) and xg = x̃g = 1 − x̃b ∈ (x∗g, x∗gb) (in all
other cases).
3. If only two different policies can be implemented (xg and xb), with the additional
constraint that xb = D−xg, then the policies xg = x∗g = (1−p)D and xb = x∗b = pD
deliver the highest expected utility to the voters .
Given the restriction that at most two different policies can be implemented, the (un-
constrained) social welfare optimum cannot be implemented since there are three different
realizations of voters’ most preferred policy, given the underlying information structure.
The first point of the lemma follows directly from our definition of optimal policies. The
second point shows that it is possible to design “skewed” policies such that one of the two
policy is “extreme” and played only when the two signals are identical, while the other is
“moderate” and played in all other circumstance. Those perform (slightly) better than
policies symmetric around the “neutral policy” x∗gb = D/2, corresponding to the restric-
tion xb = D− xg. Observe, that the policies x∗g = (1− p)D and x∗b = pD are also voters’
preferred policies when only one signal is revealed.7
3.4 Political competition
In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), party i chooses its policy platform xi so as to
maximize its expected utility, given the strategy of the other party: x−i(s−i). Assuming
that party 2 adopts strategy x2(s2), and that voters respond to platform choices (x1, x2)
with beliefs µ(x1, x2) that lead to an optimal voting probability for party 1 of σ(x1, x2), the
6The precise value is x̃b = D
(2−p)p
1−2(1−p)p , but it plays no role in our subsequent analysis.
7Under the constraint of symmetric policies around x∗gb, Lemma 1 is thus reminiscent of Theorem
2 in Kartik et al. (2015) showing that any equilibrium where both parties are elected with positive
probability yields the voter strictly lower ex-ante expected utility than in a situation where one party is
always elected, offering the optimal policy conditional on its signal.
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expected utility of party 1, Es2|s1U1(s1, s2, x1, x2(s2), σ(x1, x2(s2))), given that it received
signal s1 and chooses policy platform x1, is given by
Es2|s1
[
σ(x1, x2(s2)) (u(β(s1, s2), x1) + f1) + (1− σ(x1, x2(s2)))u(β(s1, s2), x2(s2))
]
. (14)
Consider again the case of symmetric revealing strategies. Assuming that party 2
sticks with the equilibrium strategy (i.e., x2(g) = xg and x2(b) = xb), the above expecta-
tion becomes for an arbitrary choice of x1:
Pr[s2 = g|s1]
[
σ(x1, xg) (u(β(s1, g), x1) + f1) + (1− σ(x1, xg))u(β(s1, g), xg)
]
+ Pr[s2 = b|s1]
[




Note that given our earlier assumptions it holds that σ(xg, xg) = σ(xb, xb) = 1/2. Fur-
thermore, in the special case where the equilibrium platform choices xg and xb are located
symmetrically around the neutral policy, we have
σ(xg, xb) = σ(xb, xg) = 1/2,
since voters do not learn anything from observing contrasting platforms in a symmetric
revealing equilibrium, and each of the policies xg, xb then yields an identical expected
welfare.
3.5 Equilibrium concept
Given our earlier assumptions, we can summarize our model as follows. There are three
strategic players: party 1, party 2, and the voters acting as one player. In the first
move, nature picks the state of the world, W ∈ {G,B} (each with a probability of
1/2), and signals si ∈ {g, b} for party i ∈ {1, 2} with Pr[si = g|W = G] = Pr[si =
b|W = B] = p. In the second move, the two parties simultaneously choose action
(platform) {x1, x2} ∈ X, after observing only their own signal. Finally, voters choose
action σ ∈ [0, 1] (the probability with which they elect party 1), after observing only x1
and x2 (and not s1, s2, or W ). Assuming that the other party adopts strategy x−i(s−i),
and that voters elect party 1 with a probability of σ(x1, x2), party i’s expected utility
(i = 1, 2) is Es−i|siUi(si, s−i, xi, x−i(·), σ(·, ·)), as defined in (14) for party 1 (similarly for
party 2).
In the context of this model, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a profile of
strategies (x∗1(·), x∗2(·), σ∗(·, ·)), combined with voters’ beliefs that assign a probability of
µ(x1, x2) to the state W = G, conditional on observing actions x1, x2 ∈ X, such that
(i) party i’s strategy is optimal given the strategy of party −i and voters’ strategy
σ∗(·, ·), for i = 1, 2,
11





(iii) the voters’ strategy is optimal for each (x1, x2), given voters’ beliefs µ(x1, x2).
We further assume that if one party plays an action that is consistent with the equilib-
rium strategy of that player (i.e., should be played for some realization of this player’s
signal), whereas the other party chooses an “off-path” action that should never be played
according to the equilibrium strategy of that player (for any realization of his signal),
voters rationalize the observed actions with the fewest deviations and therefore identify
the party playing an off-path strategy as the deviator (Bagwell and Ramey, 1991). We
need this assumption when studying whether a unilateral deviation from an equilibrium
to such an action can be profitable.
It is well-known that models such as this one may display a large number of PBE,
some of them relying on out-of equilibrium beliefs that are not plausible. For this reason
it is useful to introduce a refinement criterion. Following the idea of Cho and Kreps
(1987) in a one-sender, one-receiver game, our goal is to identify unilateral deviations
from a proposed equilibrium strategy to an action x′i, that would never be profitable for
party i after observing one (and only one) of the two possible realizations (g/b) of signal
si, irrespective of what voters might infer about the signal that this party received. In
that case, the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) requires that voters put zero
probability on that realization of the signal si when they observe the off-path policy
platform x′i.
A formal definition of the equilibrium refinement is provided for interested readers
in Appendix A. Furthermore, we show that when considering whether a deviation could
be profitable for some beliefs, it is enough to verify whether it is profitable for extreme
beliefs ŝi(x
′
i) ∈ {g, b}.
4 Results
Let us now proceed to the results of the model. While most authors so far have focused
on symmetric equilibria, we show the existence of asymmetric equilibria (almost) effi-
ciently aggregating the information received by the two parties. When there are only two
parties or candidates, with any symmetric equilibrium, at most two different policies can
be implemented, while four different policies can be implemented in an asymmetric equi-
librium. An asymmetric equilibrium is therefore a natural candidate to reach the social
welfare optimum, because in the latter there are only three different policies that need




gb), depending on the realization of the two signals.
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8Another approach allowing to implement more than two different equilibrium policies would be to
consider a third party always offering the “neutral” policy D/2. Felgenhauer (2012) studies cases in which
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Subsequently, we also analyze symmetric revealing equilibria, and non-revealing (pan-
dering) equilibria. Such equilibria have also been analyzed by other authors, in related
frameworks. Our contribution is to identify when they exist in the presence of policy
motivation. Using results from behavioural economics and the study of focal points we
then discuss when we can expect to observe each equilibrium.
4.1 Asymmetric revealing equilibria
Consider the following (candidate) equilibrium. Suppose, party 1 offers policy platforms
near the extremes of the policy space, that is, x1 = x
∗
gg if s1 = g and x1 = x
∗
bb if s1 = b. By
contrast, party 2 offers platforms in the center of the policy space. For a social optimum,
it is necessary that both parties are able to convey their private information truthfully
and credibly to the voters. Hence, the case where party 2 always offers the platform
x∗gb = D/2, irrespective of its signal, cannot lead to the social optimum. However, that
platform choice is optimal whenever the two signals are conflicting. One way to resolve
this problem would be to add a “cheap talk” stage to the game where party 2 can announce
whether it received a good or a bad signal, independently of its actual platform choice.
In order to avoid such a change in the structure of the game, we assume instead that
party 2 announces a platform choice of D/2 − α when it receives a good, and D/2 + α
when it receives a bad signal, where α is a (small) positive number. This way, party 2’s
platform choice is still ‘revealing’, yet, in the limit case where α → 0, the implemented
policy effectively leads to the same welfare as the policy x = D/2 whenever this party is
elected.
Definition 1. A strategy xi(s) is extreme if xi(s) = x
∗
ss for any s ∈ {g, b}. Instead, it is
moderate if there exists α > 0 such that xi(b) = D/2+α < x
∗
bb and xi(g) = D/2−α > x∗gg.
While it is possible to construct a variety of out-of-equilibrium beliefs such that an
asymmetric equilibrium with an extreme and a moderate party exists, we focus our
attention on the intuitive criterion. The intuitive criterion implies that voters correctly
infer the only signal realization for which a deviation to x′i is profitable, for some beliefs
of the voters, if such a deviation exists.
Proposition 1. 1. Define f opt ≡ D2
8(1−2p+2p2)2 > 0. For all f2 < f
opt, there exists some
ε̄ > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄] an asymmetric equilibrium satisfying the intuitive
criterion in which party 1 plays an extreme strategy and party 2 plays a moderate
strategy x2(b) = D/2 + ε and x2(g) = D/2− ε exists.
such a completely uninformed candidate can restore efficiency. This approach has its own limitations.
Some voting systems make it difficult for more than two parties to co-exist and finance elections. It is
also unlikely that a party identified as incompetent wins an election including other issues.
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2. There exists fasym > f opt such that, if f2 < f
asym, then there exists an asym-
metric equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion in which party 1 plays an ex-
treme strategy and party 2 plays a moderate strategy x2(b) = D/2 + α < x
∗
bb and
x2(g) = D/2− α > x∗gg, with α > 0.
In such an asymmetric equilibrium, we have two clearly identifiable parties playing
different strategies. One party is “moderate” in the sense that it conveys its message
while offering a “safe” platform in case the message of the other party is conflicting. The
second party is “extreme” in the sense that it offers the anti-pandering policy x∗gg (resp.
x∗bb), depending on its signal. Only one party (the moderate one) has to be sufficiently
policy-motivated for the equilibrium to exist. The less this party is policy-motivated, the
less moderate policy it can offer in equilibrium. The extreme party can have any kind of
motivation, as it benefits both from being elected whenever the other party obtains an
identical signal (with a probability greater than 1/2) and from seeing the almost socially
optimal policy being implemented for any realization of s1 and s2.
As parties are clearly identifiable, the equilibrium can be sustained even for parameter
values for which the moderate party might mimic the anti-pandering strategy of the ex-
treme one. The equilibrium then exists if, when indifferent, voters elect the non-deviating
party. This strategy seems natural as voters never lose from applying it and can sustain
the equilibrium that brings them the highest utility for a larger range of parameters.
Such a pattern of voters “preferring the original” is often described as characterizing
extreme-right votes surges when a moderate right-wing party tries to move too far to the
right (see Arzheimer, 2009). Our model gives a simple theoretical explanation for such
patterns: as voters benefit from the existence of a moderate party, it is in their interest
to ensure it remains moderate, and there is no cost of doing so.
While there is some freedom in the “design” of an asymmetric equilibrium regarding
the exact choice of the moderate party’s policy platforms, the equilibrium policy platforms
of the extreme party are always x∗gg (resp. x
∗
bb). Those extreme platforms correspond to
the social optimum for the case where two conforming signals are revealed. The moderate
party’s platforms are located symmetrically around the neutral policy, but there remains
a range of distances to D/2 such that an asymmetric equilibrium exists. As both parties
and voters have the same objective function regarding the implemented policy, it seems
reasonable to focus on the case where voters and parties coordinate on an equilibrium
with the smallest possible distance to the neutral policy, such that party 2 can still
credibly convey its signal to the voters via its platform choice. If f2 is sufficiently small
(f2 < f
opt), then the distance to D/2 can be arbitrarily small. Indeed, party 2 then only
deviates from the neutral policy in order to convey its signal. By contrast, if f2 is larger
but not too large (f opt < f2 ≤ fasym), then the distance to the neutral policy must be














Figure 2: Profitable deviations from the asymmetric equilibrium strategies for the
moderate party 2 for some beliefs; thick green line: after observing s1 = g; thin red line:
s1 = b, for D = 1, p = 0.7, with x2(g) = D/2− α and x2(b) = D/2 + α.
unprofitable. When the office motivation of the moderate party converges to the threshold
fasym, its strategy converges to the strategy of the extreme party. Therefore, under the
intuitive criterion, the asymmetric equilibrium presented in this section “converges” to
a symmetric anti-pandering equilibrium when both parties’ office motivation becomes
sufficiently large. We study such a symmetric equilibrium in the next section.
We illustrate this equilibrium in Figure 2. The bottom part corresponds to a param-
eter value of f2 = 0.4. For this parameter value, the asymmetric equilibrium exists, with
α strictly positive as f opt < f2 < f
asym. The green (red) line at the center illustrates the
platform choices x2 to which party 2 could profitably deviate under some beliefs of voters
about the realization of s2, after observing s2 = g (resp. s2 = b). We know (see Appendix
A) that in order to identify such deviations it is enough to focus on the most extreme
beliefs ŝi(xi) ∈ {g, b}. The lines are fully overlapping because a deviation to a policy
in this range is profitable whenever voters infer that party 2’s signal was either good or
bad (depending on s1). Hence, the intuitive criterion does not restrict out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. We show in the proof of Proposition 1 that for any policy x ∈ (D/2−α,D/2+α)
out-of-equilibrium beliefs such that no party offering this policy is ever elected when the
other party plays an extreme strategy x∗gg or x
∗
bb can always be constructed. Hence, a
“moderate” strategy can span a large policy space and become arbitrarily close to x∗bb
(resp. x∗gg), corresponding to our condition f < f
asym. Other standard refinements such
as Universal Divinity9 (Banks and Sobel, 1986) or Perfect Sequential Equilibrium10 (PSE,
9In our model the set of best-responses to a policy choice that can be beneficial after observing one
signal is not included in the set of best-responses that can be beneficial after observing the other signal,
unless when the deviation is never profitable for one signal. We can thus never say that one deviation
is “more likely” than the other if a deviation to some x′ is profitable for some beliefs for player i after
observing both signals. See appendix B of Callander (2008) for a formal definition of Universal divinity
in the context of a voting model.
10Translating into our notation, the PSE algorithm works as follows. First, if a deviation to some x′ is
profitable for some beliefs for player i after observing both signals, impose that voters ignore the signal
received by player i, ŝi(x
′) = n. Second, for a deviation to such a x′ to be profitable under PSE it must
15
Grossman and Perry, 1986) do not rule out such out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
An important characteristic of the asymmetric equilibria we characterize here is that
each of the two parties is identified as being either “moderate” or “extreme”, for each
realization of its signal. The reason is that parties alternating being moderate or extreme
depending on the signal they receive would not permit to reach the (almost) efficient
outcome of Proposition 1. Consider an asymmetric equilibrium where, say, party 1 plays
x1(g) = x
∗
gg and x1(b) = D/2, while party 2 plays x2(g) = D/2 and x2(b) = x
∗
bb. Such an
equilibrium cannot lead to the first-best because for s1 = g and s2 = b an extreme policy
is always implemented.
4.2 Symmetric revealing equilibria
As indicated in Section 3.3, a “symmetric revealing equilibrium” consists of two choices,
xg and xb, such that party i chooses xi = xg if si = g and xi = xb if si = b. In the analysis
of symmetric revealing equilibria, we sometimes refer to xg and xb as ‘strategies’, when
xi(g) = xg and xi(b) = xb holds for both parties.
It is possible to show that if voters ignore off-path platform choices in their formation
of beliefs, the symmetric policies x∗g and x
∗
b described in the third part of Lemma 1
constitute a PBE (see online Appendix). However, the result comes with the caveat
that voters ignore the information transmitted by a party playing some off-path platform
x′i, even if the only possible signal for which such a deviation is profitable under some
beliefs is g (resp. b). For example, if party 1 receives signal s1 = g, then a deviation to
x′1 = x
∗
gg is profitable when voters infer ŝ1(x
′
1) = g. Then if s2 = g, party 1 is elected
for sure (rather than with a probability of 1/2 – as in equilibrium), and in addition,
it implements a policy that is (in expectation) superior to the policy that would be
implemented in equilibrium. It is straight-forward to show that the deviation leads to an
increase in party 1’s expected payoff. Conversely, if s1 = b then party 1 has no incentive
to deviate to x′1 = x
∗
gg, irrespective of voters’ beliefs. Such an equilibrium therefore does
not satisfy the intuitive criterion.
This intuition is actually more general and applies to any candidate equilibrium in




Lemma 2. There are no out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such
that symmetric revealing strategies (xg, xb) 6= (x∗gg, x∗bb) constitute an equilibrium.
actually be profitable both when si = g and si = b given that ŝi(x
′) = n. In the asymmetric equilibrium,
there is no such profitable deviation: a deviation to some x′ smaller (resp. higher) than x∗gb can only be
profitable for beliefs ŝi(x
′) = n after si = g (resp. si = b). Hence, PSE yields the same outcome as the
intuitive criterion. The same holds for the symmetric equilibrium studied in the next section. Loertscher

















Figure 3: Profitable deviations from the equilibrium strategies {x∗gg, x∗bb} for some
beliefs; thick green line: after observing s1 = g; thin red line: s1 = b, for D = 1, p = 0.7
The profitable deviations that are underlying this (negative) result are generally to-
wards the anti-pandering strategy x∗gg (if xg 6= x∗gg), resp. to x∗bb (if xb 6= x∗bb). Only in
the special case where one of the two strategies (xg, xb) is already the corresponding anti-
pandering strategy (x∗gg, resp. x
∗
bb), while the other one is not, the profitable deviations
underlying Lemma 2 may be different, but it is still possible to show that there exist
profitable deviations under the intuitive criterion.11
The above result implies that there exists only one candidate PBE with symmetric
revealing strategies satisfying the intuitive criterion, corresponding to the anti-pandering
strategies x∗gg and x
∗
bb. Our next result shows that such an equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 2. There always exists a symmetric revealing equilibrium satisfying the
intuitive criterion in which parties adopt the anti-pandering ‘strategies’ x∗gg and x
∗
bb.
We illustrate on Figure 3 the logic behind this equilibrium, by studying whether
there exist profitable unilateral deviations for party 1 when party 2 plays the equilibrium
strategy.
The top of Figure 3, plotted for f1 = 0.65, corresponds to a party 1 with high office
motivation. The thick green lines show how far away from x∗gg party 1 is willing to go
after observing s1 = g while misleading the voters to believe it has observed s1 = b with
sufficiently high probability. The tin red line shows how far away from x∗bb party 1 is
willing to go after observing s1 = b. When the line are not overlapping, the intuitive
criterion requires voters to correctly infer the signal and the deviation is not profitable.
When they are overlapping, we have shown in the previous subsection that it is always
possible to construct out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such that
11The proof of this specific aspect is a bit involved and provided in an online appendix.
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party 1 is never elected when unilaterally deviating to x′1 against party 2 playing the
anti-pandering strategy. When office motivation decreases (f1 = 0.55 and f1 = 0.40), the
overlapping part shrinks and eventually disappears.
Then, for even lower office motivation, we start to observe potential policy motivated
deviations. Party 1 is willing to reduce its chances of being elected in order to improve
the quality of the implemented policy under conflicting signals. This is the reason why
we observe again profitable deviations around the neutral policy D/2, for some beliefs,
for f1 = 0.31. The deviations are symmetric around D/2 because they are only profitable
if the deviating party would be elected under conflicting signals, in which case it is
indifferent between policies equidistant from D/2 as µ = 1/2. Hence, it is possible
to construct out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such that party 1
deviating towards the center is never elected. The same holds when when office motivation
decreases even more (f1 = 0.25) and the overlapping lines stretch further away from D/2.
While Proposition 2 implies that an anti-pandering equilibrium always exists and
satisfies the intuitive criterion, a crucial assumption is that the ex-ante probability of
the state being good is exactly 1/2. Else, voters are not indifferent between x∗gg and
x∗bb when signals are conflicting (see Loertscher, 2012). Consider the case where x
∗
gg is
preferred to x∗bb when signals are conflicting: for the highest levels of office motivation,
a party could deviate from the anti-pandering equilibrium by choosing policy x∗gg upon
observing signal b, and be elected with probability one when the other also observed b,
and with probability 1/2 when the other observed g. For a symmetric anti-pandering
equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion to exist with ex-ante probability different
from 1/2, policy motivation must therefore be sufficiently high for a party to trade-off a
higher probability of being elected for a better policy. We show in the online Appendix
that our asymmetric equilibrium is however robust to such skewed beliefs. Indeed, in
this equilibrium, two players never offer an extreme platform at the same time, so that
it does not matter whether voters prefer one or the other when parties transmit different
signals. As from Lemma 2, no other symmetric revealing equilibrium exists.
4.3 Non-informative equilibrium
When both parties have high office motivation, a non-informative “pandering” equilib-
rium exists, similar in spirit to the one described by Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003).
Proposition 3. There exists a symmetric “pandering” equilibrium satisfying the intuitive
criterion where both parties offer the platform x = D/2 regardless of the signal they receive
if and only if for both parties, office motivation is sufficiently high (fi > f
p).
The idea behind the pandering equilibrium is that if both parties have sufficiently
strong office motivation, voters cannot infer anything from a party deviating from the
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equilibrium strategy as any deviation that manages to attract voters would be profitable
regardless of the signal received. Hence, there is no profitable deviation from the “pander-
ing strategy” xi(g) = xi(b) = D/2 (i = 1, 2). This result mirrors the results of Heidhues
and Lagerlöf (2003) and Loertscher (2012) who restrict their attention to purely office-
motivated parties. When office motivation is low however, there are some deviations
profitable only after observing the “right” signal.
4.4 Equilibrium selection
Combining Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we observe that the game displays multiple equilibria
satisfying the intuitive criterion. For the highest levels of office motivation, the anti-
pandering equilibrium coexists with the non-revealing pandering one. If, for at least one
party, office motivation is low enough (fi ≤ fasym for one i ∈ {1, 2}), the anti-pandering
equilibrium coexists with an asymmetric “almost efficient” one. If both parties have
enough policy motivation (fi ≤ fasym for both i ∈ {1, 2}), the anti-pandering equilibrium
continues to exist but there is an additional coordination problem in the asymmetric equi-
librium, as both parties could be the “moderate” one. For some intermediate parameter
values, all equilibria can even co-exist. A natural question is thus to understand when
we can expect parties to coordinate on which equilibrium.
It is useful to note that there is a clear ranking of the different equilibria from a voters’
perspective. First, the anti-pandering equilibrium always dominates the pandering one.
The expected utility gain from implementing the anti-pandering policy instead of the
pandering one when the two signals are identical is equal to the expected utility loss
from doing so when two signals are conflicting.12 As signals are more often identical than
conflicting, the ranking follows. Second, an asymmetric equilibrium always dominates the
anti-pandering one as the policies are identical when signals are conforming, but closer
to the center when signals differ.
The coordination problem is however among parties, not voters. Consider first the
case when the asymmetric equilibrium does not exist (fi > f
asym for both i ∈ {1, 2}).
When coordinating on an equilibrium, experimental evidence shows that players trade-
off payoff-dominance and risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988 ; Schmidt at al,
2003). As parties have the same probability of being elected in both the anti-pandering
and the pandering equilibrium, and the anti-pandering equilibrium yields a better policy,
it is payoff-dominant. It is also risk-dominant as, in case the other party adopts the
pandering strategy, a party playing the anti-pandering one would be elected more often
and implementing a more efficient outcome. We can thus expect parties to coordinate
towards the anti-pandering equilibrium whenever the asymmetric one does not exist.




Second, consider the case when the asymmetric equilibrium exists with only one party
in position of being moderate, (fi ≤ fasym for one i ∈ {1, 2}). As from the previous
result, we can already rule out coordination on the pandering equilibrium if it exists.
Comparing the asymmetric equilibrium with the anti-pandering one, it is possible to
identify a threshold value on the office motivation fpd = D
2
4(1−2p+2p2)2 such that, for all
fi < f
pd, an asymmetric equilibrium with party i being moderate is Pareto-improving
over the anti-pandering equilibrium, and is therefore payoff-dominant.13 This asymmetric
equilibrium is also risk dominant as the “extreme” party plays the same strategy in
the anti-pandering and in the asymmetric equilibrium. We can thus expect that if one
and only one party has sufficiently low office motivation, coordination happens on the
asymmetric equilibrium.
Third, when the two parties have enough policy motivation to be moderate in an
asymmetric equilibrium (fi ≤ fasym for both i ∈ {1, 2}), it is clear that unless one party
has no office motivation at all (fi = 0) no equilibrium is payoff-dominant as both parties
prefer to be the “extreme” one in an asymmetric equilibrium. Moreover, the experimental
evidence is not very encouraging towards coordination in such a setting. As shown by
Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich (2008), even small payoff-asymmetry can lead to the
failure of coordination. To use their terms, there is a tension between “payoff salience”
and “label salience”. In our setting, this means that even if a party is labeled as moderate
we can only expect coordination towards an asymmetric equilibrium if being moderate is
never an equilibrium strategy for the other party.
The above discussion suggests that we can expect parties with similar office moti-
vation to behave symmetrically and coordinate on the anti-pandering equilibrium, and
sufficiently different parties to behave asymmetrically and coordinate on an almost ef-
ficient equilibrium. This implies that there are cases where voters may benefit if the
degree of office-motivation of one party (say, party 1) increases, holding f2 constant, if it
simplifies coordination towards the most efficient asymmetric equilibrium.14
13It always holds that fpd < fasym, so that there always exists values of fi such that the asymmetric
equilibrium exists but is not payoff dominant. Moreover, it is possible to show that when the signal is
not too precise (p < 2+
√
2
4 ≈ 0.85) the asymmetric equilibrium is payoff-dominant whenever an (almost)
efficient asymmetric equilibrium exists (fpd > fopt).
14Also in Ambrus et al. (2017), voters can benefit from a small amount of office-motivation, while
higher levels adversely affect welfare. The underlying mechanisms that lead to this result are, however,
different than in our model.
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5 Examples
5.1 Involvement of Western European countries in the 2003
Iraq war
On January 29, 2002, in the State of the Union address, US-president George W. Bush
declared Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to be an axis of evil. In the following months, the
European nations were divided on the issue of whether or not to support the US in a
possible war on Iraq, and if so, under what conditions. In line with our model, information
clearly played a key role in this policy issue: The US intelligence had apparently presented
evidence for a possession of weapons of mass destruction by the regime in Iraq, but the
evidence was at least questionable.
We present in Table 1 both the actual involvement and the policy positions of 15
European countries as reported by Hummel (2017). While 9 countries publicly opposed
the war, 5 supported it and 1 did not have a clear position. The actual involvement
however was broadly of three types. An “extreme” opposition to the war - refusing
any involvement or logistical support - was implemented by 4 countries. An “extreme”
support - sending combat troops - was implemented by 3 of them. Finally, a “moderate”
position of not sending troops but providing logistical support was implemented by 8
countries, among which 5 formally opposed the war, 2 supported it, and 1 had an unclear
position.
While not all of those countries had elections at the time of the war, it is striking
that their involvement is consistent with the anti-pandering and asymmetric equilibria,
except for the case of Portugal. Let us highlights two cases in particular.
In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, at the time Prime Minister and head of the
Labour Party, adopted an extreme position (relative to most other European nations),
by promising effectively unconditional support to the US, even in case of a unilateral
military attack on Iraq without a new UN-mandate. In line with both the anti-pandering
and the asymmetric equilibrium, his “extreme” policy of sending troops to the ground
was implemented as the opposition Tory party officially also supported the war. This
was clearly not a “pandering” policy as a large majority of his electorate opposed the
invasion. While the official party positions were going in the same direction, the issue
was very controversial, including inside those parties.
In Germany, in the run-up to the German federal elections (Bundestag), the incum-
bent chancellor Schröder (Social Democratic Party, SPD), announced in August 2002 that
he would not support a possible war on Iraq, not even under a new UN-mandate. How-
ever, his policy can still be classified as “moderately opposed,” as Germany nevertheless
provided logistical support, with several US military bases in the country. His opponent
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Table 1: Level of involvement and official government position on the 2003 Iraq war
Country Involvement Position Country Involvement Position
Austria none against Italy logistical in favour
Belgium logistical against Luxembourg none against
Denmark military in favour Netherlands logistical in favour
Finland none against Portugal logistical uninformative
France logistical against Spain military in favour
Germany logistical against Sweden none against
Greece logistical against UK military in favour
Ireland logistical against
Source: Hummel (2003). We use his classification as follows. We report the involvement in phases 1 and 2 (1:
pre-invasion war preparations and 2: The invasion or international war phase). We denote as “logistical” the Level 4 of
military involvement (“logistical support”). We denote as “military” the level 1 and 2 of military involvement (combat
troops with high (1) and low (2) personal risk). We denote as “none” the level 5 (no war involvement). Official position
“in favour” of the war corresponds to level 1 and 2 of the “normative perspective”, “against” corresponds to level 4 and 5,
and “unknown” corresponds to level 3.
in the election, Edmund Stoiber (Christian Social Union, CSU),15 together with Angela
Merkel,16 at the time leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, in a permanent
alliance with the CSU), by contrast, signaled support for the war, thereby adopting a
similar position as Tony Blair. The issue was key in the German elections in 2002, and
seen as one of the two main reasons17 for the reelection of Schröder and his coalition
government with the Green Party (Pulzer, 2003). Only a few weeks before the election,
the polls still pointed towards a change in the government. The outcome of the election
that took place in Germany in 2002, seems to be in line with the asymmetric equilibrium
in our model: while the CDU adopted an extreme position, Schröder’s party adopted a
more moderate one on the other side of the policy spectrum, for which case our model
predicts the moderate party to win the election.
5.2 Climate policy
The current debate about climate change revolves around the policy response to a forth-
coming environmental catastrophe, corresponding to the presence of a threshold or ‘tip-
ping point’ in the climate system (see for instance Barnosky et al, 2012). Comprehen-
sive predictions are regularly made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). As the IPCC is in the position of “natural monopoly” (Tol, 2011), the political
question is, thus, primarily whether or not to trust the current state of the scientific lit-
erature as summarized by the panel. This question constitutes a typical example where
ideological biases of experts may hinder the precision of the information transmitted, so
15“Stoiber vows to back U.S. on Iraq,” cnn.com, September 19, 2002
16“Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans,” Angela Merkel, The Washington Post, February 20,
2003.
17The other was the flooding in the Danube and Elbe valleys in mid-August, in which Schröder
“displayed almost perfect crisis-management.” (Pulzer, 2003, p.156)
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that it is reasonable to model the question as binary.18 The action space is however not bi-
nary, as the abatement of emissions is a continuous choice in the form of emission targets.
Given the complexity of the question, there is evidence that voters extract information
about the state of the world from parties’ publicly stated opinions or policy platforms
(see for instance Guber, 2013; Hornsey et al., 2016). Regarding ideology, Ansolabehere
and Konisky (2014) show that Americans are more pragmatic than ideological in their
opinions about energy alternatives and pollution.19
In most countries, political parties take either moderate or pro-active policy positions
recognizing the existence of climate change. In a recent study carried out at the COP21
climate conference, Bosetti et al (2017, p.187) find that many government negotiators take
“moderate” views of the risk posed by climate change, more distant from the scientific
consensus than the non-negotiators.20 In some countries however, and notably the US,
one political party campaigns on a “climate-skeptical” position.21 The co-existence of
many moderate and pro-active elected parties with very few climate-skeptical ones is
consistent with at least some information being transmitted in elections, either through
anti-pandering or asymmetric equilibria.
5.3 Nuclear energy in Germany
The debate revolving around the use of nuclear electricity is a recurrent topic in German
politics. Understanding the cost-efficiency and potentially dangerous nature of nuclear
power stations requires gathering a lot of information, that voters are likely to take in a
digested form from political parties. While the desirability of nuclear energy is largely a
binary question, the share of nuclear in the energy mix is a continuous decision.
In the early 2000s, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) favored a continuation of
the usage of atomic power, the Social Democrats (SPD), in alliance with the Green Party,
pushed towards a nuclear phase-out within a limited time frame. In 2002, under chancellor
Schröder and a coalition-government of SPD and the Green Party, moderate phase-out
became Germany’s official policy, based on a consensus reached with the leading electricity
companies requiring a complete phase-out until the year 2022. After chancellor Merkel
18See for instance Lupia (2013) on the difficulties to communicate science in a politicized environment.
The question is generally represented as “adhering to the scientific consensus on man-made climate
change” both in the media and in research (see for instance Cook et al., 2016).
19Moreover, while the approach may vary, ambitious pollution abatements do not have to be ideologi-
cally left-leaning, a prominent example being the first large tradable emission permit market implemented
in 1990 under the Bush administration (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998).
20The question asked to negotiators relates to their view on the scientific evidence and not on the way
to achieve international cooperation, a question outside the scope of our model.
21“The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a political mechanism, not an
unbiased scientific institution. Its unreliability is reflected in its intolerance toward scientists and others
who dissent from its orthodoxy. We will evaluate its recommendations accordingly,” US Republican
Party official platform 2016 (p.20).
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took over, and the CDU was the leading party, the phase-out policy was abandoned,
granting substantially longer usage of existing nuclear power plants to the electricity
providers. Yet, after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the CDU under Merkel
changed its position radically. In 2011, Merkel indeed committed to a much faster nuclear
phase-out, without cooperation with the electricity companies, with eight reactors shut
down immediately.22
In that context, one party (the SPD) seems to keep a “moderate” position over time,
while the other (the CDU, ideologically a rather centrist party) is much more responsive
to the information it receives. This pattern is consistent with the asymmetric equilibrium
we identify, consistent with the behavior of those parties in the example of the Iraq war
described above, and consistent with the fact that the CDU is more often in government
than the SPD.
6 Conclusion
In a complex world, even interested voters cannot be well-informed about every conceiv-
able policy dimension. Hence, they have to rely on representatives and their experts who
collect information for them. Parties can then try to signal their private information
to the voters via their platform choices, and voters elect the party that offers a more
attractive platform, given their updated beliefs.
Using a parsimonious setup, we demonstrate that when at least one party cares not
only about about holding office but also about the efficiency of the implemented policy,
representative democracy may well be able to convey the private information of both
parties to the voters. While in a symmetric equilibrium, the outcome then exhibits anti-
pandering, that is, platform choices are more extreme than would be socially desirable,
relaxing the symmetry assumption leads to a richer set of outcomes that can be imple-
mented. In particular, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which parties truthfully
reveal their private information, and the implemented outcomes are (almost) first-best
for any realization of the two parties’ signals. In this equilibrium, one party adopts more
extreme policy positions: it follows its true signal but behaves as if it had received two
signals with identical contents. The other party adopts a moderate position: close to
the “neutral policy”, voters’ preferred policy when signals are conflicting, just distorted
enough to still convey its signal credibly to the voters.
An interesting extension of our model would be to analyze whether asymmetric equi-
libria, similar to the one characterized in this paper, may exist also under a continuous
state and signal space, in a setting similar to the one of Ambrus et al. (2017). Further-
more, it is not obvious how the equilibrium outcome would change if parties have biased
22Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/, visited March 5, 2018.
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preferences. We leave these challenges as starting points for future research.
Appendix A: Equilibrium refinement
Here we provide a formal definition of the equilibrium refinement (informally discussed
in the main text), applying the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Consider a PBE (x∗1(·), x∗2(·), σ∗(·, ·)), combined with voters’ beliefs that assign a prob-
ability of µ(x1, x2) to the state W = G, conditional on observing actions x1, x2 ∈ X. The
resulting payoff of party 123 when observing signal s1 is
U∗1 (s1) ≡ Es2|s1U1(s1, s2, x∗1(s1), x∗2(s2), σ∗(x∗1(s1), x∗2(s2))). (16)
We say that action (policy platform choice) x1 is equilibrium dominated for signal s1 if
there is no voters’ belief such that party 1 would increase its payoff by playing x1.
Formally,
U∗1 (s1) ≥ Es2|s1 max
σ∈R∗(x1,x∗2(s2))
U1(s1, s2, x1, x
∗
2(s2), σ), (17)
where R∗(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1] is the set of possible equilibrium responses σ of the voters
that can arise after actions x1 and x2 = x
∗
2(·) are observed, for some belief function
µ(x1, x
∗
2(s2)) conditional on observing x1. In a PBE the belief function is constrained in
the sense that voters never assign a probability lower than zero or higher than one to
player 1 having observed a good signal, Pr[s1 = g|x1] ∈ [0, 1]. If x∗2 is a fully revealing
strategy, this constraint translates into
µ(x1, x
∗
2(b)) ∈ [βbb, βbg], (18)
µ(x1, x
∗
2(g)) ∈ [βbg, βgg]. (19)
If x∗2 is a non-revealing strategy,
µ(x1, x
∗
2(.)) ∈ [βb, βg]. (20)
An important property of R∗(x1, x
∗
2(s2)) is that voters’ best response σ (given x1 and
x∗2(s2)), as a function of µ(x1, x
∗
2), is monotonic in µ. This follows from the ordering of
x1 and x
∗
2(s2), which (for a given realization of s2) either fulfills: x1 > x
∗





2. This ordering is clearly not affected by µ. Therefore, σ as a function of µ (for
a given realization of s2), is either (weakly) increasing or (weakly) decreasing, with at
most one discontinuity. If x1 < x
∗
2, then the equilibrium probability σ(x1, x
∗
2) that voters
elect party 1 is increasing in the belief that the state of the world is good µ, while it is
23We show definitions here only for party 1; for party 2, corresponding definitions apply but are not
shown here for the sake of brevity.
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decreasing if x1 > x
∗
2. Moreover, party 1 does not care for which beliefs of the voters it
is elected, since voters’ belief does not enter directly its payoff function (only indirectly
via σ). Hence, when considering whether a deviation to x1 is profitable for some beliefs,
it is enough to verify whether it is profitable for extreme beliefs ŝ1 ∈ {g, b}.
Let X−1 = {x1 ∈ X but x1 6∈ {x∗1(g), x∗1(b)}} be the set of off-path choices of x1. Now
define for each x′1 ∈ X−1 the set S∗1(x′1) = {s1 : condition (17) does not hold}. Note that
S∗1(x
′
1) ∈ {{g, b}, {g}, {b},∅}. Intuitively, if S∗1(x′1) = {g, b} then party 1 would deviate










then party 1 would never deviate to x′1, no matter what voters infer about s1, and what
signal party 1 actually obtained. Note that in all these cases, we are assuming that
voters always respond optimally to their beliefs when choosing σ, taking party 2’s policy
platform into consideration when forming their belief µ(x′1, x2).




1) = {g} then ŝ1(x′1) = g,
(ii) if S∗1(x
′
1) = {b} then ŝ1(x′1) = b.
To verify whether a unilateral deviation from a candidate equilibrium can be profitable
under the intuitive criterion, the procedure is as follows. First, we need to verify whether
we are in case (i) or (ii), and in order to do so it is enough to consider whether a deviation
to x′1 is profitable for extreme’ beliefs ŝi ∈ {g, b}. Second, in the case S∗1(x′1) = {g, b} one
can assign any weight on player 1 having observed s1 = g, as long as µ(x1, x
∗
2) satisfies
conditions (18), (19) and (20). The case S∗1(x
′
1) = ∅ is trivial as such a deviation is by
definition never profitable.
Appendix B: Proofs





2. If strategies are skewed xb 6= D−xg then one platform yields strictly higher expected
utility when signals are conflicting. Consider first the case in which policy xg is
chosen only when signals are identical s1 = s2 = g. The maximization problem is
max
xg ,xb
Pr(s1 = s2 = g)u(βgg, xg) + Pr(s1 6= s2)u(βgb, xb) + Pr(s1 = s2 = b)u(βbb, xb).
(21)
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As x∗gg is optimal for s1 = s2 = g it is straightforward that xg = x
∗
gg. We also find
xb = x̃b = D
(2−p)p
1−2(1−p)p ∈ (D/2, x
∗
b). A similar result can be reached with x
∗
bb chosen
only when signals are identical s1 = s2 = b, as the problem is symmetric.
3. Given the parties’ strategies xi(g) = xg and xi(b) = xb with xb = D − xg and











(1− p)2(1− xg) + p2(1− xb) + p(1− p)((1− xg) + (1− xb))
]
,
where we have used the assumption that voters choose xg resp. xb with a probability
of 1/2 when platforms differ, and the probabilities: Pr[W = B] = 1/2, Pr[s1 =
s2 = g|W = B] = (1−p)2, Pr[s1 = s2 = b|W = B] = p2, as well as Pr[si = g, s−i =
b|W = B] = 2p(1 − p). The maximization over xg and xb then yields xg = x∗g and
xb = x
∗




b yield identical utility when signals are conflicting, taking the
probability of one party being elected under conflicting signals to 1 does not affect
aggregate welfare. As conditional on one of the two probabilities of being elected
under conflicting signals, we have shown in 2. that skewed signals are optimal, we
know that the restriction xb = D − xg yields lower expected welfare.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given parties’ equilibrium strategies, when s1 = s2 = g or when
s1 = s2 = b then party 1 wins the election with probability 1, whereas when signals are
conflicting party 2 wins with probability 1. If party 1 receives a good signal, its expected







+ (1− π)u(1/2, D/2− α).
If party 2 receives a good signal, its expected payoff in equilibrium is
πu(βgg, x
∗
gg) + (1− π)
[
u(1/2, D/2− α) + f2
]
,
where we use the fact that u(1/2, D/2 − α) = u(1/2, D/2 + α). Now consider possible
deviations satisfying the intuitive criterion.
Party 2: Suppose s2 = g.
Claim (i) A deviation to x′2 = D/2 + α is not profitable. If this deviation induces
voters to draw an incorrect inference about party 2’s signal (ŝ2(x
′
2) = b), party 2’s winning
probability is raised. The implemented policy is, however, less efficient than under party
2’s equilibrium strategy. Comparing party 2’s expected welfare under the equilibrium
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strategy (see above) with its welfare under the deviation:
π
[
u(βgg, D/2 + α) + f2
]
+ (1− π)u(1/2, x∗bb), (22)
we obtain a lower bound for the value α,24 with dα
df2
> 0. Define f opt = D
2
8(1−2p+2p2)2 as
the threshold value of f2 such that party 2 is indifferent between deviating or not when
α = 0. When f2 < f
opt, the constraint is not binding so that the lower bound for α is
negative. If f2 ≤ f opt, we can set α arbitrarily small, but positive so that party 2 can still
convey its signal to the voters, while implementing an (almost) efficient policy (in case
this party is elected).
(ii) A deviation to x′2 ∈ (x∗gg, D/2 − α) is not profitable. The deviation policy is too
distorted to be a profitable deviation after observing s2 = b (see (i)). Hence, the intuitive
criterion requires that if a deviation to x′2 is profitable for some beliefs after observing
s2 = g, voters infer with probability 1 that party 2 observed signal g. However, for
ŝ2(x
′
2) = g, the deviation is not profitable as party 2 would get elected with the same
probability as under the equilibrium policy (i.e., only when signals are conflicting), but
the implemented policy is then inferior.
(iii) A deviation to x′′2 ∈ (D/2 + α, x∗bb) is not profitable, because it leads to a lower
payoff than a deviation to x′2 = D/2 + α (ruled out in (i)).
(iv) A deviation to x′2 ∈ (D/2 − α,D/2 + α) is not profitable if f2 < fasym. For a
deviation to a policy in this range, there always exists a belief of voters about s2 such
that the deviation is profitable, under both signal realizations (s2 = g and s2 = b), as
follows from our discussion above (see case (i)).
We want to show that there exist out-of equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive
criterion such that party 2 deviating to x′2 ∈ (D/2−α,D/2+α) is never elected when party
1 plays its equilibrium strategy, regardless of s1, for all D/2−α > x∗gg and D/2 +α < x∗bb
with α defined above (see just below (22)). As there exist some beliefs such that a
deviation to any x′2 ∈ (D/2− α,D/2 + α) is profitable after observing s2 = g or s2 = b,
using the intuitive criterion, any belief that puts weakly positive probability on each




2) ∈ [βbg, βgg] (23)
µ(x∗1(b), x
′
2) ∈ [βbb, βbg]. (24)
































Where (25) corresponds to player 2 not being elected by choosing x′2 when player 1
observed a good signal, and (26) to player 2 not being elected by choosing x′2 when player
1 observed a bad signal. The beliefs µ(x∗1(g), x
′




2) = βbb satisfy












bb) > u (βbb, x
′
2) . (28)
By our definition of x∗gg, the only value such that inequality (27) is not satisfied is x2 = x
∗
gg
and the only value such that inequality (28) is not satisfied is x2 = x
∗
bb. Thus, there exists
out-of equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such that party 2 deviating to
x′2 ∈ (D/2 − α,D/2 + α) is never elected when party 1 plays its equilibrium strategy,
for all D/2 − α > x∗gg and D/2 + α < x∗bb. Note that this is a general result, that we
also use in subsequent propositions: it is always possible to construct out-of-equilibrium
beliefs for a policy x ∈ (x∗gg, x∗bb) putting weakly positive weight on each possible signal
such that a party offering policy x against a party playing anti-pandering equilibrium
strategies never wins the election. Using the value of α found above, we can rewrite the




2 (2p2 − 2p+ 1)
. (29)
(v) A deviation to x′2 = x
∗




bb is not profitable. To rule out this type of
deviation, we assume (see Section 3.2) that voters elect party 1 when this party chooses
one of its equilibrium policy platforms, while party 2 chooses this type of deviation
(as parties are clearly identifiable). This type of deviation is, thus, never profitable,
irrespective of voters’ belief about s2.






bb is not profitable. This claim is always true as
voters would never elect such a party after observing at most two signals when the other
party plays its equilibrium strategy (see Section 2.2).
Party 1: Suppose s1 = g. (The argument for the case where s1 = b follows analo-
gously.) A deviation by party 1 can only be profitable if (i) it strictly raises its probability
of being elected (σ), and/or (ii) the quality of the implemented policy is (in expectation)
raised due to the deviation.
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(i) It is straightforward to verify that there exists no deviation for party 1 that
guarantees this party to be elected both when s2 = g and s2 = b: irrespective of what
voters infer about the contents of party 1’s signal when observing the deviation, it always
holds that party 2’s equilibrium policy is (weakly) closer to voters’ most preferred policy
(given their belief) either under s2 = g or under s2 = b than party 1’s deviation platform.
In the knife-edge case where voters infer ŝ1(x
′
1) = g (ŝ1(x
′′
1) = b) when party 1 deviates
to x′1 = D/2−α (x′′1 = D/2 +α), voters are indifferent between parties’ platforms under
both realizations of s2. In this case, we can simply assume that voters elect the party
that did not deviate (see Sections 3.2 and 4.1). Since, in equilibrium, party 1 is already
elected with certainty under party 2’s most likely signal realization (given s1 = g), a
deviation can only (weakly) reduce σ.
(ii) This is impossible to achieve because party 1’s equilibrium policy is already op-
timal when signals are conforming; if party 1 were purely policy-motivated, its best
(candidate) deviation would be to offer x′1 = D/2 − ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small
positive number (just large enough so that voters can still distinguish this policy from
D/2) when s1 = g, resp. x
′′
1 = D/2 + ε when s1 = b. This way, party 1 could still convey
its signal to the voters, and (assuming voters believe in this) party 1 would get elected
whenever signals are conflicting, in which case the welfare-optimal (neutral) policy would
be offered (distorted only by ε, that is assumed infinitesimally small). It is however pos-
sible to construct out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion and ruling
out such a deviation. Every such deviation that is profitable under some beliefs after
observing a given signal is also profitable for some beliefs after observing the other signal.
The intuitive criterion therefore does not rule out any belief on the signal observed by
party 1. Hence, for any equilibrium policy of player 2 and any such candidate deviation
to x′1 by party 1, the intuitive criterion only yield the following constraints
µ(x′1, x
∗
2(g)) ∈ [βbg, βgg] (30)
µ(x′1, x
∗
2(b)) ∈ [βbb, βbg]. (31)


















Indeed, as x∗2(g) is located between x
∗
gg and D/2, we can always find µ(x
′, x∗2(g)) such











2(b)), x) and voters always prefer party 2.
Hence, as long as D/2 − α > x∗gg and D/2 + α < x∗bb, it is possible to construct
out-of-equilibrium beliefs sustaining the equilibrium. The condition for an asymmetric
equilibrium to exist satisfying the intuitive criterion therefore corresponds to D/2− α >
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x∗gg (or D/2 + α < x
∗
bb), f < f
asym.
Proof of Lemma 2. We first show that there exists a profitable deviation if at least one
platform is “very extreme” x /∈ [x∗gg, x∗bb]. Suppose xg < x∗gg. (The case where xb > x∗bb
follows analogously.) When s1 = g, then for all ŝ1(x
∗
gg) ∈ {g, b}, a deviation by party 1 to
x∗gg increases both the probability of being elected and the quality of the expected policy.
With probability π, s2 = g, and it always holds that σ(x
∗
gg, xg) = 1 and u(βgg, xg) <
u(βgg, x
∗
gg). With probability 1−π, s2 = b, and it always holds that σ(x∗gg, xb) ≥ σ(xg, xb).
It is also easy to verify that if σ(x∗gg, xb) > 0, then u(βgb, xb) < u(βgb, x
∗
gg). The same
reasoning holds for xb > x
∗
bb.
Second, consider symmetric strategies with xg > D − xb, and xb 6= x∗bb, so that
u(βgb, xg) > u(βgb, xb), and σ(xg, xb) = 1. Under the proposed equilibrium strategy, the
expected utility of party 1 after receiving a good resp. bad signal is
U∗1 (g) = π(u(βgg, xg) +
f1
2
) + (1− π)(u(βgb, xg) + f1),
U∗1 (b) = π(u(βbb, xb) +
f1
2
) + (1− π)(u(βgb, xg)).
We want to show that x∗bb is a profitable deviation after observing s1 = b under the only
belief satisfying the intuitive criterion ŝ1(x
∗
bb) = b. For this, we need to show that (i)
x∗bb is not a profitable deviation for any belief after observing s1 = g, and (ii) x
∗
bb is a
profitable deviation for ŝ1(x
∗
bb) = b after observing s1 = b.
For claim (i), it is enough to study ŝ1(x
∗
bb) = b to characterize all profitable deviations
to x∗bb when s1 = g. Indeed, player 1 is never elected if s2 = g (σ(x
∗
bb, xg) = 0 and
all ŝ1(x
∗




The expected utility under the suggested deviation is
U1(x
∗
bb | s1 = g, ŝ1 = b) = πu(βgg, xg) + (1− π)(u(βgb, x∗bb) + f1) < U∗1 (g),
as u(βgb, x
∗
bb) < u(βgb, xg).
For claim (ii), the expected utility under the suggested deviation is
U1(x
∗
bb | s1 = b, ŝ1 = b) = π(u(βbb, x∗bb) + f1) + (1− π)u(βgb, xg) > U∗1 (b).
Third, consider symmetric strategies with xg > D − xb, and xb = x∗bb, so that
u(βgb, xg) > u(βgb, xb), and σ(xg, xb) = 1. Under the proposed equilibrium strategy,
the expected utility of party 1 is as in the second part of the proof, replacing xb = x
∗
bb.
In this case, x∗bb is not a deviation anymore. It is however possible to show that such
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an equilibrium never exists sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive
criterion (see online appendix).
Finally, consider symmetric strategies with xg = D − xb, so that both xg 6= x∗gg and
xb 6= x∗bb.
Under the equilibrium strategy, the expected utility of party 1 after receiving a good
resp. bad signal is








We want to show that x∗gg is a profitable deviation after observing s1 = g under the only
belief satisfying the intuitive criterion ŝ1(x
∗
gg) = g. For this, we need to show that (i)
x∗gg is not a profitable deviation for any belief after observing s1 = b, and (ii) x
∗
gg is a
profitable deviation for ŝ1(x
∗
gg) = g after observing s1 = g. For (i), for reasons similar as
in the second part of the proof, it is enough to consider ŝ1(x
∗
gg) = g. Under the assumed
beliefs, σ(x∗gg, xb) = 0 and σ(x
∗
gg, xg) = 1. This yields expected payoff
U1(x
∗
gg | s1 = b, ŝ1 = g) = π(u(βbb, xb)) + (1− π)(u(βgb, x∗gg) + f1) < U∗1 (b).
For (ii), the expected payoff under the proposed deviation is
U1(x
∗
gg | s1 = g, ŝ1 = g) = π(u(βgg, x∗gg) + f1) + (1− π)u(βgb, xb) > U∗1 (g).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We study deviations by party 1 after observing s1 = g, assuming
equilibrium behavior for party 2. The other case (deviations after observing s1 = b), and
deviations by party 2, follow analogously by symmetry.
Claim (i) A deviation to some “extreme” policy x1 < x
∗
gg or x1 > x
∗
bb is never prof-
itable. This claim is always true as voters would never elect such a party after observing
at most two signals when the other party plays its equilibrium strategy.
(ii) There exists out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such that
a deviation to some “moderate” policy x ∈ (x∗gg, x∗bb) after observing s1 = g is never
profitable if it is profitable for some beliefs after observing s1 = b. We have shown in
the proof of Proposition 1 (iv) that it is always possible to construct out-of-equilibrium
beliefs for a policy x ∈ (x∗gg, x∗bb) putting weakly positive weight on each possible signal
such that a party offering policy x against a party playing anti-pandering equilibrium
strategies never wins the election.
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(iii) There is no profitable deviation to some x′ 6= x∗gg after observing s1 = g if x′ is
not a profitable deviation after observing s1 = b for any beliefs. The intuitive criterion
requires that for such a deviation, out-of-equilibrium beliefs must be ŝ1(x
′) = g. Upon
observing s1 = g, if party 2 plays its equilibrium strategy, the policy x that maximises the
probability for party 1 to be elected by voters who believe ŝ1(x) = g is x
∗
gg. A deviation
to x1 6= x∗gg thus never increases the probability of being elected. If the observed signals
are identical (with probability π > 1
2
), x2 = x
∗
gg is voters’ preferred platform and party 1
is never elected under the deviation. Hence, the probability of being elected could be at
most 1−π < 1/2. The only potentially profitable deviation must therefore induce better
expected policies, which is only possible under conflicting signals (as the policy is already
optimal for identical signals). Such a deviation is profitable under the assumed beliefs, if
there exists an α > 0 satisfying
πu(βgg, x
∗
gg) + (1− π)
[




gg) + (1− π)u(1/2, x∗gg) + f1/2.
However, if the deviation is profitable for x1 ∈ (D/2 − α,D/2), it is also profitable for
x1 ∈ (D/2, D/2 + α) under the assumed beliefs as policies equidistant from D/2 are
equally good when µ = 1/2. This implies that any policy in this interval would also be a
profitable deviation after observing s1 = b under some beliefs. As, by (ii) we know that
it is possible to construct out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such
that the deviation is not profitable, the equilibrium always exists.
Proof of Proposition 3. In equilibrium, both parties are elected with equal probability
and the implemented policy is D/2. We study deviations by party 1. First, note that
it is easy to construct out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion if a
deviation to some x1 6= D/2 is profitable for some beliefs after observing s1 = b and
s1 = g. Indeed, if voters ignore the signal received by party 1, ŝ1 = n, the party is never
elected, and such beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Hence, for a deviation to x′1 ∈ [0, D2 ) to be profitable after observing s1 = g, it must
be that (i) the deviation is profitable after observing s1 = g for voters beliefs ŝ1(x
′
1) = g,
(ii) x′1 is never a profitable deviation after observing s1 = b. We want to identify a value
of f1 = f
p
g such that for all f1 > f
p
g there is no deviation satisfying (i) and (ii).
(i) We identify x̃g such that there is a profitable deviation to x
′
1 ∈ (x̃g, D/2) but no
profitable deviation to x′1 < x̃g after observing s1 = g. For a deviation to be profitable
for party 1 under some beliefs, x′1 must be in the range of values of x strictly preferred
by voters to D/2 if ŝ1(x
′
1) = g, so that their beliefs that the state of the world is G are
µ(x1, D/2) = β(g, n) = p. The minimum value of x satisfying this condition is defined
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by:
u(p,D/2) = u(p, x),
x = D
2
(3 − 4p). As we assume the policy space is comprised between 0 and 1, we find
x̃g = max{D2 (3 − 4p), 0}, so that x̃g = 0 for all p > 3/4. If the deviation is preferred
by voters, it is also preferred by party 1 as it gets elected with probability σ = 1 and
implements a better policy.
(ii) For party 1 to benefit from a deviation to x′1 ∈ (x̃g, D/2) after observing s1 = b,
it must be that ŝ1(x
′
1) = g. Else, the party is never elected. The worst policy outcome
in this range after observing s1 = b is x̃g. Hence, if a deviation to x̃g is profitable, all
deviations to x′1 ∈ (x̃g, D/2) are profitable.
A deviation to x̃g is profitable under some beliefs after observing s1 = b whenever






2D2(2p− 1)2 if p < 3/4D2
4
(4p− 1) if p ≥ 3/4.
(33)
Hence, for all values of f1 > f
p
g , any deviation that is profitable after observing
s1 = g is also profitable after observing s1 = b, so that it is possible to construct out-of-
equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion such that the deviation is not prof-
itable.
We can similarly identify a maximum value of x such that voters are indifferent
between policy x̃b and policyD/2 if they believe party 1 observed s1 = b, x̃b = min{D2 (4p−





2D2(2p− 1)2 if p < 2+D4D(2−D)(2+(4p−3)D)
4




We define fp = min{fpg , f
p
b }. From the above we have proven that, if for both parties
fi > f
p, it is possible to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion
such there is no profitable deviation from the pandering equilibrium. All deviations that
are profitable under some beliefs after observing s1 = g (resp. b) are also profitable under
some beliefs if s1 = b (resp. g).
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Strömberg, D. (2004) Mass media competition, political competition, and public pol-
icy. The Review of Economic Studies, 71, 265-284.
Tol, R. S. (2011) Regulating knowledge monopolies: the case of the IPCC, Climatic
Change, 108(4), 827-839.
Wittman, D. (1983) Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories, Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 77(1), 142-157.
37
